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forthcoming) and Israel Kirzner (forthcoming) have been engaged in a debate concerning 
how  economists  should  understand  and  use  the  terms  “coordination”  and  “economic 
goodness”.  Klein  and  Briggeman  (forthcoming)  contend  that  Kirzner  suffers  from 
excessive ambition scientifically. The authors claim Kirzner’s reliance and identification 
with  “the  Misesian  image  of  science”  threatens  to  discredit  his  more  sensible 
contributions  (e.g.,  market  processes  are  driven  towards  progress  by  competitive 
entrepreneurial discovery). We offer a response  to Klein and Briggeman’s claim that 
loose, vague and indeterminate forms of economic reasoning make for a more robust 
political  economy.  In  doing  so,  we  also  explain  the  theoretical  context  surrounding 
Kirzner’s theory of the entrepreneurial market process. While we agree with Klein and 
Briggeman’s critique of scientism and formalism, we emphasize the nature of the debates 
over market theory and the price system that Kirzner was engaging in order to understand 
the reasons behind his methods and the theoretical insights they provide. Rather than the 
source of his failure, we view Kirzner’s “excessive ambitions” to provide a scientific 
foundation  of  the  market  process  as  the  source  of  his  great  success  as  an  economic 
theorist. 
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Corridors, Coordination, and the Entrepreneurial Theory of the Market Process 
 
We have been asked to contribute to an on-going conversation between Daniel 
Klein (Klein 1997, Klein and Orsborn 2009 and Klein and Briggeman forthcoming) and 
Israel Kirzner (forthcoming) who have been engaged in a debate concerning how 
economists should understand and use the terms “coordination” and “economic 
goodness”. Klein and Briggeman (forthcoming) contend that Kirzner suffers from 
excessive ambition scientifically. “[He] makes ‘always’ – or ‘necessarily’ – type claims – 
categorical claims – where the claims instead should be ‘usually’ or ‘by and large’ (p. 
2).” To Klein and Briggeman, Kirzner’s reliance and identification with “the Misesian 
image of science” threatens to discredit his more sensible contributions – market 
processes are (Klein and Briggeman hope to add the caveat “usually”) driven towards 
progress by competitive entrepreneurial discovery.  
There are more arguments in Klein and Briggeman’s paper than we could hope to 
address in this short paper. Kirzner’s (forthcoming) response goes a long way toward 
sorting these issues out and demonstrating where Kirzner is being misread by Klein and 
Briggeman. He writes, “[their] criticisms are embedded in an idiosyncratic doctrinal – 
history framework (relating particularly to the Austrian tradition (ibid, p. 1).” Kirzner 
continues to clarify that even though an “objective understanding of economic 
processes… demonstrates distinct economic advantages for a classical liberal society 
does not, in principle, nullify the need to ensure that the public does not dismiss such 
demonstrations as motivated by ideologically based preconceptions (p. 2).” Kirzner 
explains that “Modern Austrian Economics, finds its roots in Mises and Hayek not for   3 
any ‘praxeological’ foundations, but for the insights and understandings to be found in 
their work, concerning the nature of the market process (p. 5).”  
We try to respond to Klein and Briggeman’s claim that loose, vague and 
indeterminate forms of economic reasoning make for a more robust political economy. In 
response, we explain the theoretical context surrounding Kirzner’s theory of the 
entrepreneurial market process. Readers must understand the nature of the debates over 
market theory and the price system that Kirzner was engaged within in order to 
understand the reasons behind his methods and the theoretical insights they provide. 
Kirzner’s research project was aimed to fill theoretical gaps within the neoclassical 
research project and we would argue he succeeds on this margin.  
Klein and Briggeman support loose, vague and indeterminate reasoning as 
opposed to axiomatic reasoning.  Klein’s (Klein 1997, Klein 2009, Klein and Lucas 2009, 
Klein and Orsborn 2009, Klein and Briggeman forthcoming) research offers unique 
interpretations of concepts first introduced by Adam Smith. Klein (Klein 2005) also holds 
unique positions regarding the roles of positive and normative science in economics.  We 
agree with the critique of formalism and scientism, but we also argue that economists 
should not condemn performing economics as a positive social science altogether.  There 
is, we contend, a way to do positive economics without committing the intellectual errors 
that Klein believes are necessary if one is to stress the scientific nature of economic 
reasoning.   4 
  Rather than the source of his failure, we view Kirzner’s “excessive ambitions” (to 
provide a scientific foundation of the market process) as the source of his great success as 
an economic theorist. Kirzner is perhaps too humble of a scholar to take such credit, 
constantly giving credit to his teacher Mises, rather than emphasizing his own 
contributions.  But the questions he tackled in his development of the entrepreneurial 
theory of the market process are at the core of the scientific legitimacy behind the entire 
neoclassical enterprise of market theory and the price system.    
Kirzner’s creative synthesis of Mises and Hayek, was employed to address a 
theoretical lacuna in neoclassical theory. Kenneth Arrow (1959) exposed this gap when 
he explained that in a world where everyone is postulated to be a price taker, there is no 
explanation left for how prices would ever change to clear markets?  A theory of 
disequilibrium adjustment was required to complete the neoclassical theory of the 
competitive market, but no such theory was possible that treated prices as parametric.  
Franklin Fisher (1983, p. 3) explained that the neoclassical theory of the market faced a 
dilemma unless it had appropriate disequilibrium foundations.  Without a theory to 
explain the process of adjustment from disequilibrium to equilibrium, the first and second 
welfare theorems, the corresponding notions of exchange efficiency, productive 
efficiency and product-mix efficiency would be little more than a set of unjustified 
beliefs.  
Kirzner provides us with the ability to cope with disequilibrium, and how market 
participants learn through time and adjust (if the data of the market were frozen) to a 
point of equilibrium.  Given the significance of the problem identified by Arrow and 
Fisher, Kirzner’s theoretical contributions to scientific economics should not be   5 
undersold.
2  One must place Kirzner in his appropriate theoretical context in order to 
understand the way he synthesizes Mises and Hayek to make an original contribution to 
the neoclassical theory of markets and prices. 
Kirzner basically defends the project of theoretical economics from Adam Smith 
to Ludwig von Mises, F. A. Hayek and beyond.  Too much of the Klein and Briggeman 
critique is tied to what they see as Kirzner’s effort to create a unique Austrian identity - 
axiomatic economics.  We alternatively see Kirzner and modern Austrian economics as a 
crucial portion of the larger neoclassical project to understand the price system and the 
market economy (Boettke 1994 and 1996). There is an important distinction between 
mainline economic thinking and mainstream economic thinking. The mainline of 
economic science/policy is the consistent teaching throughout the history of the discipline 
that emphasizes the “interests” of individual decision-makers, the “invisible hand” of the 
market, and the way in which private property, free pricing, and profit and loss 
accounting steer economic activity so that social cooperation under the division of labor 
is made possible in a society of diverse and socially distant participants.  The mainstream 
                                                 
2 The interested reader is directed to the 2 volume reference work by Boettke and 
Prychitko, eds., Market Process Theories (1998) for a collection of the main papers on 
the market process from a mathematical, institutional, heterodox and Austrian 
perspective. 
4 The notion of the corridor came from Axel Leijonhufvud (1981) in his essay “The 
Wicksell Connection: Variations on a theme,” in Information and Coordination. The 
basic idea is that inside of the corridor the self-correcting dynamics of the market are in 
operation, but economic crises occur when activity spills outside of the corridor and the 
forces of self-correction cannot be relied upon.  For our purposes, Kirzner’s focus is on 
economic activity that is in a disequilibrium situation, but inside the corridor.  In this 
sense, entrepreneurial activity is not discoordinating, but always bringing in line the plans 
of economic actors with the underlying realities of tastes, technology, and resource 
scarcity.  Kirzner’s distinction between the underlying (tastes, technology, and resource 
constraints) and induced (prices and profit and loss) variables of the market should never 
be forgotten in assessing his theory of the entrepreneurial market process. See Kirzner, 
The Meaning of Market Process (1990).   6 
of economic science/policy, on the other hand, does not designate any substantive 
proposition. It is a sociological designation related to what is and what isn’t scientifically 
fashionable at any given point.  Sometimes the mainline and the mainstream are identical, 
other times they deviate from one another.  It is our contention that whenever the 
mainstream significantly deviates from the mainline it becomes important to  emphasize 
the unique contributions of particular schools of thought in the attempt to close that gap.  
The classical political economy of Smith and Say contained elements of incentive 
analysis, a refined understanding about the role of local knowledge, and an appreciation 
of private property rights. Classical economists saw the market as a process of 
competitive rivalry and dynamic entrepreneurial discovery. They placed importance on 
the economics of organizations, and examined the political process with the same 
behavioral assumptions that they used to examine the market process. Kirzner plays an 
important role in this history rightly listed alongside Mises and Hayek. 
While the development of marginal utility analysis and the subjective theory of 
value revolutionized the way economists thought at the turn of the 20
th century, the basic 
argumentative structure concerning broad brush political economy (including the concern 
with special interests and monopoly privileges) can be traced to the Scottish 
Enlightenment, the French Liberal tradition, the British Utilitarian Philosophers, and the 
Austrian School of Economics.  Many of these same insights had to be rediscovered and 
reintroduced into the economic discourse in the post WWII era by the Chicago School, 
the UCLA property rights school, the Virginia School of Political Economy, the New 
Institutionalist School, and the modern Austrian school of economics.  Without these 
“new developments” in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the mainstream deviation from the   7 
mainline teachings would have gone uncontested.  And since the term neoclassical 
economics came increasingly in the 1940s and 1950s to represent a methodological 
position rather than a set of substantive propositions about the economy, the school labels 
played an extremely important role as an intellectual corrective to the hegemony of 
Keynesian macroeconomics and market-failure theory in microeconomics. 
 Kirzner’s role in championing the Austrian school was no different from the role 
played by Friedman, Stigler, Becker and Lucas in championing the Chicago School, or 
Alchian and Demsetz in championing the UCLA property rights school, or Buchanan and 
Tullock in championing the Virginia school, or Coase, North and Williamson 
championing the New Institutionalist school. The counter-revolution of these traditions 
pushed back against the scientifically and politically fashionable mainstream, and 
brought economic thinking back (at least to a considerable extent) to the mainline of 
thinking from Adam Smith to F. A. Hayek.  Kirzner and others guided this counter-
revolution without which the excessively aggregative macroeconomic and institutionally 
antiseptic microeconomic theory that Samuelson ushered in would still dominate 
economic thinking. 
We believe Klein and Briggeman have failed to stress this intellectual context of 
Kirzner’s contribution to economics.  But they err in another way as well.  Because they 
fail to understand the context of Kirzner’s contribution, they also misread his substantive 
theoretical contribution.  Klein and Briggeman’s criticism of Kirzner’s fails to appreciate 
the distinction between the framework within which economic activity transpires and the 
activities themselves.  To help in understanding Kirzner’s contributions we suggest that  
the concept of  “the corridor of economic activity” and the coordinating role of   8 
entrepreneurship within a given “corridor” is very useful and may go a long way to 
addressing Klein and Briggeman’s criticisms.
4  
Kirzner treats the institutional framework of economic life as exogenously given, 
and examines instead economic activity within that existing framework.  The 
exogenously given framework consists of the legal system, its enforcement, the monetary 
system, and the underlying moral set of beliefs that sustain the system of property, 
contract, and consent.  Inside of this system, Kirzner examins how economic actors 
engage in open-ended choice. They discover the opportunities for mutually beneficial 
exchange and they act on price discrepancies to realize pure profit. They recognize the 
gains from novelty and innovation and they act upon those opportunities in pursuit of 
profit.  To put the Kirznerian point in the context of the basic principles of economics, the 
entrepreneur not only ensures that the economic system tends to operate on the 
production possibilities frontier thanks to arbitrage, but the system also exhibits a 
ceaseless tendency to push the production possibilities frontier outward as entrepreneurs 
innovate in the delivery and production of existing products and new products to satisfy 
consumer demands.  Ray Croc didn’t invent the hamburger, French fries, or the 
milkshake.  But Ray Croc did discover a new way to deliver them, and McDonald’s has 
become an international symbol of capitalism and globalization.  Bill Baumol (2002) has 
in fact described the entrepreneurial market economy as a free market innovation 
machine.  Within the “corridor” of given institutions and the values that support those 
institutions (and provide them with legitimacy), the entrepreneurial activity of individuals 
(in both its arbitrage and innovative capacity) will lead to price signals and profit 
opportunities that steer individuals along the path to coordinate their plans with one   9 
another. When the most willing suppliers and the most willing demanders settle on the 
terms of exchange only then are the gains from trade and the gains from innovation 
realized.   
There is nothing loose or vague or indeterminate about this, it instead follows 
directly from the logic of entrepreneurial discovery once all the subsidiary arguments are 
understood and accepted.  To Kirzner, economic science is not a science of exact 
equilibrium states, but a science of tendencies and directions of change - what Hayek 
(1974) called pattern prediction.  In the process of change some plans will obviously be 
upset, and others will be surprisingly satisfied, but provided economic activity stays 
inside the boundaries set by the corridor, the ceaseless change in the market place will be 
directed toward the alignment of the induced variables with the underlying variables of 
the market (and the realization of the gains from trade and the gains from innovation). 
Kirzner’s coordination point, his point about the dovetailing of plans and his point on 
equilibration are all simply affirming the basic economic point that individuals will 
realize mutual gains from trade. To put it in more Kirznerian language, individuals will 
be alert to that which is in their interest to be alert to; they will discover that which is in 
their interest to discover.  
Here again, Klein and Briggeman fail to recognize the broader context of debate 
surrounding Kirzner’s position. Kirzner’s (1998) proposes that social coordination - 
defined as the harmonious coexisting plans of interacting human individuals – be 
considered as a proxy to represent social welfare. Again Klein and Briggeman dislike 
Kirzner’s use of the term coordination in favor of alternatives laid out in Klein and 
Orsborn (2009). To them, Kirzner is too positivist and they prefer a definition for   10 
coordination that implies reference to a “super-knowledgable” and normatively intuitive 
onlooker (See also Klein forthcoming). We propose that this definition of concatenate 
coordination is not Smith’s intention behind the impartial spectator as developed in The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) but it is instead something quite different.
5 Kirzners’s 
position – social coordination can proxy for social welfare -  was a reaction to the 
arguments within mainstream welfare economics.  Kirzner is attempting to provide an 
acceptable answer to his fellow economists on their terms that cultivates an appreciation 
for the entrepreneurial market process and the knowledge generating and system learning 
properties of the market process. 
Louis Pasteur is quoted as saying that “fortune favors the prepared mind.”  
Kirzner’s entrepreneurial theory of the market process translates this critical insight into 
economics.  It is not an insight that was new to him. Adam Smith (1776) captured the 
basic idea in his famous butcher, baker and brewer example, and even more in his 
example of the vast social cooperation under the division of labor evident in the exchange 
and production of the common woolen coat.  Private property and freedom of contract, by 
steering individual interests in certain directions to realize the mutual gains from trade 
and capture the gains from innovation, leads to the “invisible hand” results of the market 
economy that Smith had identified.  The entrepreneurial impulse to be alert to the 
opportunities to ‘truck, barter and exchange’ produces a dovetailing of economic plans 
such that social cooperation among strangers is realized and the productivity gains Smith 
                                                 
5 Klein (2009) does provide an electronic data-base analysis of the history of the use of 
the term coordination.  But we believe that his emphasis on specific use fails to capture 
the meaning of the concept, and that the idea of the coordination of economic activities 
has a much deeper meaning even if at times the terms used - cooperation and mutual 
cooperation are meant to capture the ideas of coordination (concatenate, mutual, and the 
dovetailing of plans).     11 
identified that follow from the division of labor (specialization and exchange) result in 
wealth creation and human betterment. To turn a blind eye to Kirzner’s contributions, we 
contend, is to miss out on the essential Smithian ideas of specialization and exchange, 
complex coordination beyond computation; and cooperation without command.  In short, 
Kirzner is the further elaboration of Smithian mainline economics in the context of mid- 
to late-20
th century economics through a creative synthesis of the contributions of Mises 
(1949) and Hayek (1948) as embedded in Human Action and Individualism and 
Economic Order.   Without this rendering of the Smithian position, the Samuelsonian 
sterility of economic teaching would have more of a grip on the intellectual imagination 
of economists than it already does.  We believe that if Klein and Briggeman kept this 
context in mind that much of the criticisms they level against Kirzner would disappear, 
and that Klein’s own Smithian project would be advanced through alliance with Kirzner 
and the Austrian school rather than splitting semantic hairs.   12 
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